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Governance Structures and Trust: a Study of Real Estate Networks 
J.M.G. Boaventura, A.A.C. Carnaúba, E. Todeva, A.C. Azevedo and E. Armando1 
Abstract 
The present study aimed at verifying how different modes of governance structure are linked to 
different levels of interorganisational trust. Its theoretical grounding involves Transaction Cost 
Theory, which studies governance of interorganisational arrangements and research on trust in the 
business field. A descriptive and quantitative approach has been adopted to describe the relation 
between trust amongst business network participants and the mode of governance adopted by the 
surveyed networks. Hence, a detailed questionnaire has been employed, which was answered by 35 
real estate agency managers, whose participation was directly linked to 11 business networks. By 
using Spearman methods of identification of non-parametric correlation and correspondence 
analysis, it was possible to verify that certain modes of governance structure associate with different 
levels of trust. Considering the scarcity of quantitative research on the theme, this paper contributes 
to the field by presenting results which point out that collectively-managed governance of regional 
cooperation networks is linked to high levels of trust; whereas governance of dispersed networks 
with the presence of a lead company are linked to low levels of trust. Medium levels of trust were 
observed in networks governed by an administrative organisation. Considering the practical aspect 
of administration in networks, one can conclude that the process of governance structure in such 
interorganisational arrangements should include deliberations about the influence of the adopted 
mode of governance on trust amongst participants. The paper does not allow generalizations of its 
conclusions beyond its chosen sample. 
Keywords: Brazil; competitiveness; governance structure; real estate networks; dimensions of trust. 
1. Introduction 
The interest in business networks has increased due to a growing number of companies which have 
been organised in networks as an alternative in their search for competitiveness (Idris, 2013; Jones 
et al., 1997). Their rise in the last few decades has resulted from advancements in information 
technology, amongst other factors, which have allowed new and more flexible organisational 
structures (Nohria, 1992). Such flexibility allows productive chains to adopt more outspread and 
diffuse arrangements, adapted to a context of rising competitiveness at a global level.  
Under certain circumstances the performance within networks becomes a new competitive pattern 
so its ‘locus’ shifts from the rivalry amongst individual organisations to a competition amongst 
networks (Park, 1996; Provan et al., 2007; Zaccarelli et al., 2008). In this context, these authors 
defend the importance of governance role in network performance and competitiveness. 
Analysing governance and management of networks is a way to understand how such arrangements 
function, and how some conditions in their organisation may influence the attained results (Provan 
and Kenis, 2008). Although it may be possible for networks without formalised coordination to reach 
positive results, their full potential will only be realised through the application of governance 
                                                          
1 Boaventura, J., Carnaúba, A., Todeva, E., Azevedo, A. and Armando, E. (2016) Governance Structures and Trust: a Study of 
Real Estate Networks, Journal on Chain and Network Science, 16(2): 157-170, DOI: 10.3920/JCNS2015.0008.   
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mechanisms which allow strategic co-alignment and coordination between individual efforts and 
network investments (Zaccarelli et al., 2008). 
A few variables influence the adoption of a certain mode of network governance, with trust being an 
essential component (Zaheer et al., 2000). Trust allows the development of cooperation efforts 
towards common goals (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Van de Ven and Ring, 2006). Based on trust, 
organisations can strengthen relationships, allowing the exchange of knowledge and resources and 
maximising value creation (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). High levels of trust may have a positive impact 
on network performance, as concluded by Zaheer et al. (1998), Dyer and Chu (2003), Krishnan et al. 
(2006), Mu et al. (2008), and Gulati and Nickerson (2008). 
Literature also acknowledges a link between trust and governance within networks (Burlat et al., 
2003; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). A few studies examining this link pointed out that networks with 
formalised governance structures tend to reduce levels of trust present in their relationships (Dyer 
and Chu, 2003; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Gulati, 1998; Inkpen and Curral, 
2004). On the other hand, studies such as Poppo and Zenger's (2002), and Lui and Ngo's (2004), 
inform that formal governance mechanisms might complement and favour the development of trust 
amongst organisations. 
The relation between network governance and trust has not been consolidated in the literature yet, 
which is an evidence of the need for studies dedicated exclusively to its analysis (Fritz et al., 2008; 
Gulati and Nickerson, 2008; Klijn et al., 2010; Lui and Ngo, 2004). A theoretical gap has thus been 
identified regarding the understanding about the relation between structural modes of governance 
and interorganisational trust. There is a lack of evidence concerning which structural modes of 
governance in business networks relate to different levels of trust. This gap constitutes the main 
research problem in the present paper. 
This paper aims at verifying how different modes of governance structure are linked to different 
levels of interorganisational trust. It uses quantitative research in the context of intermediating 
activities in real estate network transactions in Brazil. Hence it is expected to contribute to business 
studies, extending the understanding of the relation between these two constructs, essential to 
network competitiveness: trust and governance. 
The theoretical foundation on which the study develops comes from the New Institutional 
Economics approach, specifically from the Transaction Cost Theory of Williamson (1979, 1985). This 
framework considers that performance in business networks in which there are positive levels of 
trust amongst parties favours the competitive performance of those networks, either by reduction 
of costs, which are then shared, or by adding value to offered services (Lazzarini et al., 2001; Leick, 
2013; Man, 2004). The typology defined by Provan and Kenis (2008) was employed to analyse the 
modes of governance structure. Moreover, Zaheer et al. (1998) supplied grounding work to analyse 
dimensions of trust in business networks. 
The real estate market in Brazil 
The policies of expansion of real estate credit in Brazil have exponentially increased levels of real 
estate transactions in the country, rising from 61.1 thousand units financed in 2005 to 242.2 
thousand units in 2011 (Brazilian Association of Real Estate Credit and Savings Entities [ABECIP], 
2012). The development of the real estate market translated into an increment of activity in the 
sector, which originated the search for strategic alternatives by those companies intermediating real 
estate sales and rental. 
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Prior to such intensification, the organisation of real estate intermediation activity was basically 
comprised of smallsized companies, fragmented and organised as family businesses, which were 
barely professional and showed a nearly absent mechanism of network integration. That reality of 
small real estate agencies reflected independent operations, with a limited frequency of transactions 
in partnerships. Cooperation difficulties observed in the sector were attributed to issues related to 
organisation and trust (Alves et al., 2011). 
However, once real estate agencies became concerned with updating their management model in 
order to achieve higher levels of competitiveness, they began to search for alternative business 
models, amongst which network integration was highlighted (Hoher and Tatsch, 2011). This model, 
based on the integration amongst legallyindependent and occasionally competing agencies, which 
complementarily perform common activities in order to reinforce their competitive positioning in 
the market, characterises what Park (1996) calls 'horizontal networks'.  
The trend towards integration amongst real estate agencies has been observed by Alves et al. 
(2011), and Hoher and Tatsch (2011), who have identified the potential of competitiveness 
maximisation amongst companies operating in cooperative transactions, due to a better utilisation 
of client and real estate portfolios in both companies. 
Networks rise once there is an identification of common problems and the establishment of 
common goals by a group of organisations (Park, 1996). Nevertheless, the continuity of that 
cooperation is linked to their capacity of meeting proposed targets and making their participants 
more competitive. Hence the network must be structured, organised and managed (Zaccarelli et al., 
2008). Governance is one of the key-aspects for the network to develop and for targets to be met. 
However, one observes that the emergence of real estate networks gave birth to the coexistence of 
non-homogeneous structures, since the consolidation of those networks is still at its initial stages. 
According to the Federal Council of Real Estate Agents (Cofeci) (2012), institute that regulates 
intermediation of real estate business in Brazil, there are about 40 thousand real estate agencies and 
220 thousand individuals working as real estate agents in Brazil, showing the high level of 
fragmentation in the sector. 
Within this framework one can observe a series of networks introduced into the Brazilian markets in 
the past few years, from those organised by small real estate agencies which group together with no 
hierarchisation whatsoever and restricted geographical operations, to international networks of real 
estate franchises. Moreover, it is possible to verify the existence of networks acting in the entire 
country and led by larger-sized organisations, which complement their real estate intermediation 
services with real estate credit offer. 
Considering the present study, the recent development of networked arrangements in the Brazilian 
real estate market exhibits a rich context for the proposed analysis, once it allows the observation of 
networks in different stages of evolution and forms of governance. 
2. Literature review and theoretical background on business networks under the new institutional 
economics 
Business networks have become an increasingly interesting theme in the business literature. Castells 
(2000) notes that the world economy presents itself as an extensive network of financial 
transactions, production sites, consumer and labour markets, fuelled by money and information 
flows, and company organisations. This context favours the organisation of companies in business 
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networks with the goal of cooperatively pooling resources and capabilities to achieve competitive 
advantages (Idris, 2013). 
A network is comprised of two or more organisations involved in a long-term relationship (Thorelli, 
1986), displaying characteristics of dependence, reciprocity and mutual support amongst parties 
(Powell, 1990). In this sense, business networks can be seen as a group of legally independent 
organisations which act collectively to meet their individual and collective group goals at the same 
time (Provan and Kenis, 2008). In order to understand business networks, it is necessary to 
understand the relations amongst their constituting parts (Majava et al., 2013). 
Under the perspective of the New Institutional Economics, the competitiveness of networks is 
analysed through the transaction cost approach (Leick, 2013). In this framework hereby also 
employed, networks stand out as hybrid arrangements that allow flexibility and reduction of 
transaction costs in complex environments with high levels of uncertainty and demands for specific 
assets (Jones et al., 1997; Lazzarini et al., 2001; Leick, 2013; Menard, 2004). The arrangements of 
business activities tend in the long term to structure themselves (according to the transaction cost 
theory) so that transaction costs are as low as possible amongst existing organisational alternatives; 
thus a productive arrangement with lower transaction costs will be more competitive than another 
one with higher costs (Williamson, 1979, 1985). 
The association in business networks drives companies to achieve strategic attributes such as 
relational economies and economies of scale, complementariness of skills, access to tangible and 
intangible resources, learning opportunities, reduction of transaction costs and innovation (Lin et al., 
2009; Sydow, 2004). Moreover, it allows the enhancement of the partners' market power, as well as 
an increase in their competitiveness, whether due to reduction of costs which are shared, or to 
value-adding to the services offered (Man, 2004). 
Specifically, the trend towards organisation in real estate networks has been observed in recent 
studies developed by Alves et al. (2011) and Hoher and Tatsch (2011). These authors identified the 
potential maximization of competitiveness in real estate companies, as a result of often making 
transactions in partnerships, and operating in network settings. According to Alves et al. (2010), 
integration in real estate networks allows participating companies to pool their resources, which are 
comprised mainly of their respective client and estate portfolios. 
Modes of governance structure in networks 
In the contextualisation of business networks, it is believed that factors such as asset specificity, 
informational asymmetry and possibility for opportunism might impact transaction costs amongst 
parties. Thus governance solutions which allow coordination amongst network agents with low 
transaction costs are searched for in the competitive environment (Provan and Kenis, 2008; 
Zaccarelli et al., 2008). 
Several studies have highlighted the relevance of governance structure to network performance, 
such as: Grandori and Soda (1995), Menard (2004), Park (1996), Provan and Kenis (2008) and Van 
Meerkerk et al. (2014). However, there has not been a consensus in literature regarding which 
modes of governance structure in networks would be associated more often with better  
performances. 
Under the perspective of the New Institutional Economics, governance structure of business   
networks is linked to the evolution of the group of companies, conditioned by constraints in the 
environment where it develops (Menard, 2004). From a phase of shared collective governance in 
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which trust relations allow an initial transaction level amongst parties, through networks possessing 
a leadership element or hub that acts as a coordinating element, the network could further develop 
until it forms a bureaucratic managing entity, which will play the role exclusively allotted to network 
coordination. 
Several authors have been searching for a classification of networks that could serve as a parameter 
in research on network governance. Amongst these, Grandori and Soda (1995) present a typology of 
classification related to structure. According to them, networks can be classified as symmetrical 
(there is no central company) or asymmetrical (one company centralises all relations), where they 
can also be bureaucratic (relations and coordination formalised in contracts) or social (purely social 
relations without formalisation) regarding the formalisation level axis. 
Park (1996), on the other hand, arguments that networks can generally present two modes of 
governance: bilateral and trilateral. Bilateral governance refers to the cases in which network control 
and coordination are shared by managers of participating firms without an autonomous entity 
created for this purpose. Trilateral governance is characterised by the creation of an autonomous 
management entity, which monitors the behaviour of participants and manages the process of 
collective decision-making. 
Another typology is present in the literature by Provan and Kenis (2008), who propose three types of 
governance structure in inter-organisational relations: (1) participant – governed networks that are 
characterised by collective strategic and operational decisions made by network participants without 
a formal structure beside the interactions amongst agents; (2) lead organisation – governed 
networks in which there is a common goal which allows the integration amongst network agents, 
and in which there is an organisation of sufficient size and power to lead the network; and (3) 
network administrative organisation, with an individualised structure dedicated to network 
management as a whole, regardless of the structure of participating companies. 
Considering the absence of one single typology for governance based on network classification, this 
paper adopts the model of Provan and Kenis (2008), which has a strong alignment with its 
objectives. In the present study, networks with the participant – governed networks governance, will 
be labelled as follows: regional cooperation networks (COOP), the networks with the governance 
called lead organisation – governed networks, refer to the dispersed networks with a lead company 
(LEAD) and, finally, the networks governed by administrative organisation remain with the same 
designation (NAO). 
Trust dimensions in network relationships  
Amongst investigations which further identify the factors of network competitiveness, studies like 
those developed by Dyer and Chu (2003), and Gulati and Nickerson (2008) identify inter-
organisational trust as an essential factor, since higher trust levels allow reductions of transaction 
costs, enhancing competitiveness in business networks. This reduction is generated by networks 
performing repeated transactions and developing trust (Leick, 2013). 
Generally, there has been a consolidation of the positive association between trust and performance 
in the literature, as identified by the studies of Afuah (2013), Dyer and Chu (2003), Gulati and 
Nickerson (2008), Gulati and Sytch (2008), Li et al. (2013) and Zaheer et al. (1998). In this context, 
trust is understood as the belief of an individual in a vulnerable position that another individual in 
good faith will not do him wrong (Van de Ven and Ring, 2006). Trust amongst organisations refers 
thus to the assurance that one partner will not exploit the other partner's vulnerability (Gulati, 
1998). 
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Zaheer et al. (1998), when researching the theme of trust, highlight the need for a multidimensional 
analysis, differentiating interpersonal trust and inter-organisational trust. Inter-organisational trust 
actually does not refer to that trust shown by an organisation itself, but to a level of trust shared by 
the group of individuals of a certain organisation when interacting with another organisation. 
Furthermore, inter-organisational trust reflects those procedures institutionalised during the 
succession of transactions and interactions taking place in the relationship amongst organisations. 
Interpersonal trust develops from a positive response to a previous conduct expectation of an 
individual towards another in the countless interactions which shape social relations. Likewise, inter-
organisational trust develops in each interaction established between two organisations (Zaheer et 
al., 1998) within the sphere of relationships amongst companies. 
Apart from inter-organisational and interpersonal dimensions, a few studies highlight other 
dimensions of trust analysis. One example comes from Rousseau et al. (1998), who present a model 
of trust development comprised of the institutional dimension, based on the institutional 
environment in which transactions take place; of the rational dimension, based on the perception of 
gain and risk in the transaction; and of the relational dimension, which develops in time and is based 
on the relationship amongst parties. 
To Rousseau et al. (1998), the relational dimension of trust grows as repeated transactions allow a 
higher level of exchange of knowledge and information, when considering the development of trust 
in time. Still according to the authors, the rational or calculated dimension of trust changes little in 
time, and will prevail in isolated situations in which there is not a lot of information regarding the 
counterpart. The institutional dimension, on the other hand, establishes a minimum level of trust 
common to the sector analysed, from which subsequent dimensions of trust might develop 
(Rousseau et al., 1998). 
In this study we employed the concept of trust as presented by Gulati (1998), who establishes trust 
as the assurance that a partner in a vulnerable position in a network transaction will not be harmed 
by another. On the other hand, dimensions of trust find their basis in the proposals of Zaheer et al. 
(1998), the analysis also being valid to the propositions of Zaheer et al. (1998). 
Hence, the elaboration of trust at a general level operationally involves interpersonal and inter-
organisational dimensions, incorporating elements of relational trust, based on the evolution of 
relationships amongst network members, and of calculated trust, based on a rational process related 
to risks involved in a transaction amongst companies.  
The institutional dimension of trust proposed by Rousseau et al. (1998) was not included in the 
study, since the institutional environment is reasonably common to the surveyed universe. One 
should consider that the regulation of real estate professionals is present in every region of the 
country. 
The relation between modes of governance structure and trust 
The relation between network governance and trust amongst participants is characterised in the 
literature as being interdependent. In this aspect, Gulati and Sytch (2008), and Inkpen and Curral 
(2004), note that the choice of the governance mode adopted by the network will be a decision 
influenced by the pre-existing level of trust, and that this same governance model, from a dynamic 
perspective, might influence the level of inter-organisational trust. Some compatibility between 
governance structure and the levels of trust present in networks has thus been acknowledged 
(Provan and Kenis, 2008). 
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It has thus been observed that the existence of trust among companies grouped in a network allows 
the adoption of economic governance models which incur in lower costs, enhancing transaction 
performance. Similarly, the governance mode adopted in the network might influence the level of 
trust among participants, involving higher or lower interaction levels, as well as a higher or lower 
formalisation level of established relations. 
In that sense, a few studies report that networks with more formalised governance structures might 
imply the incidence of lower levels of trust among network actors, once the relational aspect is 
replaced by the rational one, and relations begin to be mediated by formalised contracts, dispensing 
with or minimising the need for relational characteristics which allow the interaction among actors 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Inkpen and Curral, 2004). 
On the other hand, Lui and Ngo (2004), and Poppo and Zenger (2002) evidence that the 
formalisation of governance structures might favour the development of trust in the network, once 
they act as safeguards of the actors involved, that is, they represent a positive reinforcement of the 
relation among parties. Still, in highly-uncertain and complex scenarios, relations guided only by 
contracts, bonds and penalties might not be enough to assure interaction amongst actors, 
demanding the existence of trust amongst parties in order to complement such relations (Klijn et al., 
2010). 
Provan and Kenis (2008) highlight trust as one of the key factors to the effectiveness of governance 
in networks. By theorizing on the possible associations between levels of trust and structures of 
governance particular to the networks, the authors present the following propositions:  
• Networks with shared governance structures tend to show denser relations and higher, more 
generalised levels of trust amongst actors; in such structures, trust is a fundamental element in the 
development of collaborative activities. 
• Networks with a lead company responsible for governance tend to show lower-density relations 
and a highly-centralised management, which implies lower levels of interaction and trust. 
• Networks which have an administrative organisation responsible for its governance have actions of 
that leadership structure collectively monitored by its members, which generates sharing among 
companies and characterizes trust relations of a moderate level. 
However, in spite of the advances in the literature, Fritz et al. (2008), Gulati and Nickerson (2008), 
Klijn et al. (2010), and Lui and Ngo (2004), point out that the comprehension about the relation 
between trust and governance in networks is not yet consolidated, stressing the need for a wider 
range of research on the theme. Hence, there is a need for better comprehension about the link 
between the way companies structure their governance and the existing trust amongst their 
participants. 
3. Research model and methods  
This paper aims at verifying how different governance structures and levels of trust are related. With 
this goal in mind, an exploratory and quantitative study was conducted, based on the theoretical 
model shown in Figure 1. This model relates governance modes – shared governance, lead company 
governance, and network administrative organisation – to trust dimensions – interpersonal and 
interorganisational. The objective is to clarify the occurrence of influence. The model in Figure 1 
presents the two main constructs and their elements. 
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The theoretical ground admits that there is interdependence between governance mode and trust. 
In this perspective, it is observed that the governance mode chosen by the network is influenced by 
the level of trust. On the other hand, from a dynamic perspective, governance structure may 
influence the existing level of confidence (Gulati and Sytch, 2008; Inkpen and Curral, 2004). There is 
some research that argues that governance formalisation damages trust levels amongst networked 
organisations. There is also another line of thought that argues that the increase in governance 
formalisation favours higher levels of trust in the network. It can be observed that the 
interdependence is recognized in both lines of thought. However, the circumstances and strength of 
the relationship needs further clarification. This is the theoretical gap that this study seeks to fill. 
Sample and tool of data collection 
There has been a selection of Brazilian real estate agencies which explicitly participate in real estate 
networks. The selection was purposefully oriented so that networks in several evolutionary phases 
and with different modes of governance structure could be observed. By the use of the availability 
criteria, 209 real estate agencies were initially selected. The final sample is comprised of 35 real 
estate agencies participating in 11 networks established in different areas in the Brazilian territory. 
The admission criterion of a participant was its having performed at least one transaction in a 
partnership within a network in the past six months prior to the field research. The research unit was 
thus the responding real estate agency, adequately represented by a manager in charge. 
According to the propositions of Provan and Kenis (2008), different network structures are 
associated to different modes of governance structure. The real estate sector exhibits all those 
different governance structures proposed by the authors, therefore being useful to this analysis. 
The research was carried out through data collection in February and March 2012. A detailed 
questionnaire with 30 questions was elaborated and sent to managers of real estate agencies 
through an electronic platform. The tool, including indicators of trust level and data about modes of 
governance structure in networks, employed the Likert scale with a five-answer range, besides 
multiple choice questions. Four questions were proposed to test the sample eligibility. All indicators 
were selected based on the underlying theory in order to reinforce the reliability of employed 
methods. Besides that, the elaboration of the questionnaire received contribution of experts in 
order to facilitate understanding from the respondents. 
Figure 1. Conceptual research model. 
 
Secondary data for qualitative information concerning networks was also employed. More precisely, 
it contained information regarding their structure, either with or without a lead company, and either 
with or without an administrative organisation. Secondary data was obtained on the websites of 
networks. 
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Definition of the variables 
The methodological procedures involved in measurement and analysis of research variables are 
presented as follows: 
Modes of governance structure 
Data was collected on network governance in order to classify the modes of governance structure. 
This data allowed the respondents to be classified in three categories, adapted according to the 
studies of Provan and Kenis (2008): 
• Regional Cooperation Networks (COOP): collectively managed, with no leadership formalisation, 
decision-making through interaction amongst real estate agencies participating in the network. 
• Dispersed networks with a lead company (LEAD): managed by a real estate agency which stands 
out and shows leadership, seeking to reach common goals to all network members. 
• Networks governed by an administrative organisation (NAO): managed by an individualised   
structure and dedicated to the management of the network as a whole, existing only for 
administrative purposes regardless of the structure of participating companies. 
Trust 
Previous studies indicate that the multidimensional nature of trust demands a fragmented analysis 
of this construct (Rousseau et al., 1998). According to Zaheer et al. (1998), interpersonal and inter-
organisational dimensions of trust constitute interdependent constructs that join to form network 
trust. Therefore, measurement of the trust variable (TRUST) in this study was carried out by 
integrating indicators that represent interpersonal and inter-organisational dimensions of trust. And 
in order to analyse levels of trust, we have opted to work with the categorised TRUST level, hereby 
denominated TRUSTc. It was operationally defined: 
• Interpersonal Trust (IT): related to trust in the real estate agent who works for the partner agency 
in the network where the transaction was performed. This dimension was evaluated by 5 trust 
indicators, as shown in Table 1. To each indicator a questionnaire was employed (in a 5-point Likert 
scale, varying from ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’), whose results defined this interval 
variable in a scale between 5 and 25 points. 
• Inter-organisational trust (IOT): refers to the trust perceived by the respondent towards the 
partner real estate firm within the network in which a transaction with the same partner was 
performed. This dimension was evaluated by 3 trust indicators, as shown in Table 1. To each 
indicator we have applied a Likert scale questionnaire (of 5 points, varying from ‘completely 
disagree’ to ‘completely agree’), thus defining this interval variable in a range between 3 and 15 
points. 
• Trust (TRUST): comprised of the integration between dimensions of interpersonal trust (IT) and 
interorganisational trust (IOT). Its measurement was performed by adding up scores obtained from 
IT and IOT variables. This interval variable may range from 8 to 40 points in its scale. 
• Categorical Trust (TRUSTc): TRUST variable, redefined as categorical in order to be employed in a 
correspondence analysis (CORANA). In order to stratify the trust (TRUST) variable in three analysis 
categories, data was recodified towards an ordinal variable and thence classified in three levels 
(high, medium and low) by employing the k-means clustering method with the aid of SPSS 17 
software. 
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Table 1. Trust indicators. 
Dimensions Trust indicators 
 
Inter-organisational trust Business practices of partner real agency were reliable and trustworthy, conveying trust 
I completely trust in that real estate agency. Both of our companies have mutual 
relationship that conveys assurance to me, regardless of the real estate agent coming to us 
Access to other agencies and clients allowed by transactions make up for risk 
Both of our companies belonging to the same network makes the partnership much more 
reliable 
Until receiving the commission fee I had some fear of being harmed by the partner agency 
 
Interpersonal trust I trust in that agent, for I personally know him 
The partner agent's conduct conveyed trust 
The other agent's behaviour left me in doubt 
 
It is important to emphasise that the employed questionnaire identifies only the perception of trust 
from the respondent in a transaction in which he participated in the network. Trust, with its 
countless variables of sociological nature, does not allow direct measurement. 
In order to verify the internal reliability of each construct (IT and IOT) we have employed a Cronbach 
alpha-coefficient test, which is shown in the result section. The results of the test pointed out that 
the selected indicators are meaningful towards the formation of a sole scale of trust (TRUST). 
Statistical analysis 
We have employed the Correspondence Analysis (CORANA) technique for the purpose of analysing 
the found data. According to Hair et al. (2006) this technique is used in the analysis of non-linear 
relations and data with categorical responses, measured in nominal terms, in order to group 
associated variables, building the representation of relations amongst variable categories into a 
perceptual map. Correspondence analysis supplies a multivariate representation of interdependence 
for non-metric data which is not possible by using other methods. According to Hair et al. (2006), 
this interdependence technique facilitates perceptual mapping of objects in a set of non-metric 
attributes. Besides that, its compositional nature supplies higher specificity for the researcher to 
validate results. 
In order to analyse the relation between trust levels (low, medium and high) and the modes of 
governance structure of surveyed networks, the Spearman Rank Correlation technique was 
employed, due to its employing ordinal positions occupied by variables instead of their absolute 
values (Gibbons and Chakraborti, 2011; Hair et al., 2006). Bonett and Wright (2000), when testing 
different sample sizes to measure Spearman's non-parametric correlations, identified that 
acceptable results may be achieved in samples with 20 observations and higher, with a 95% 
confidence interval. As the sample is hereby comprised of 35 observations, it was possible to 
measure the significance of identified associations. 
4. Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Questionnaires were sent out to 209 different real estate agencies, 35 of which returned them 
correctly answered. Due to the high number of mandatory questions to be answered, the system 
automatically disposed of incompletelyanswered questionnaires. Therefore, the valid answer rate of 
questionnaires reached 16.7% of the total. 
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According to Table 2, the sample shows to be territorially diversified, coherent with each region's 
economic significance in the country. The Southeastern region concentrates the highest percentage 
in the sample, for it represents a higher level of industrial and urban development. It is followed by 
Southern, Northeastern and Midwestern regions. In the Brazilian context, the Northern region is 
considered the overall least economically active one, as well as in the real estate sector. Although a 
few real estate firms were found in the region, none has answered the sent questionnaires. 
It is important to emphasise the high rate of participation of real estate agencies in the Southern 
region. Two of the largest national real estate networks are also located in this region. 
Analysis of the modes of governance structure 
Regarding the governance model adopted by the networks to which the responding real estate 
agencies belong, the following frequency distribution was observed in Table 3. Regional cooperation 
networks are represented by regional action networks, with similarly-sized companies in which 
governance is shared amongst companies. According to the typology of Grandori and Soda (1995), 
this network mode characterises itself as symmetrical and social, in which social interaction is more 
prominent. In the opinion of Provan and Kenis (2008), they would characterise networks of shared 
governance. They would additionally be bilateral networks according to Park's (1996) typology, once 
there has not been an administrative structure specifically designed to governance and network 
management as a whole. 
Table 2. Distribution of respondents by region. 
Midwest  Northeast North Southeast South 
1  4 0 26 4 
 
Table 3. Modes of governance structure. 
 
Modes of governance structure  Number of respondents 
Networks of regional cooperation – COOP  13 
Dispersed networks with lead company – LEAD 11 
Network administrative organisation – NAO 11 
 
 
Table 4. Cronbach alpha. 
 
Indicators  
 
Number of questions Cronbach alpha 
Interpersonal trust (IT)  3 0.647 
Inter-organisational trust (IOT)  4 0.835 
 
Dispersed networks with a lead company, on the other hand, characterise themselves as networks 
structured by a large-sized company, which makes a system available to which smaller companies 
adhere, with a low negotiation possibility. Low loyalty and little integration in its operations were 
also verified. As regards real estate transactions, banks which finance networks and function as 
channels of real estate credit were observed to stand out. In the typology of Grandori and Soda 
(1995), they represent expressively asymmetrical networks, with governance concentrated around a 
lead company, as claimed by the typology of Provan and Kenis (2008). 
Networks with administrative organisation constitute networks with centralised governance, high 
loyalty level and maximum integration in their inter-organisational operations, including assignment 
of know-how and trademark rights. Therefore, they are relatively asymmetrical and highly 
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bureaucratic (Grandori and Soda, 1995), trilateral (Park, 1996), and with an independent governance 
structure dedicated to the network as a whole (Provan and Kenis, 2008). 
Trust dimension analysis 
For the purpose of measuring the internal reliability of trust indicators, the Cronbach alpha indicator 
was employed, since data collection was carried out by a Likert-type scale questionnaire. Table 4 
summarizes results as follows:  
Since both indicators have a reasonable degree of internal reliability and are based on the underlying 
theory, they both confer reliability and validity to those indicators employed to measure levels of 
trust amongst networked real estate agencies. 
The statistics show there is limited adherence to the normal distribution, with a higher 
concentration of indicators in high levels of trust, supplying evidence that real estate networks allow 
development of trust amongst participants. 
Correspondence analysis 
In order to allow replies to the questionnaire questions, an analysis of correspondences observed in 
the midst of levels of trust (low, medium and high) in relation to modes of governance structures in 
the surveyed networks was carried out. Table 5 lists the frequency and associations observed: 
It is observed that within regional cooperation networks, 7 out of 13 companies in a group possess 
the highest level of trust. This typology includes networks in which governance action is shared by 
participants in a reasonably symmetrical way (Grandori and Soda, 1995) by using direct negotiation 
amongst parties. 
According to data observed in the questionnaire, the limited geographical presence of such a mode 
of network structure and constant negotiation amongst parties during the decision-making process 
seem to allow a higher development of trust, especially in its relational component. 
From the perspective of Provan and Kenis (2008), this shared structure of governance is the simplest 
one, in which organization groups work collectively with no formalised administrative entity. 
Networks with such structures demand higher involvement and commitment from the participating 
organisations and consequently higher closeness and involvement amongst parties which are usually 
interdependent and work towards common goals. Hence higher levels of trust naturally originate 
from such relations. 
Table 5. Correspondences amongst answer levels. 
 
In dispersed networks with lead companies, it was observed that within a group of 11 companies, 
only one reported a high level of trust, whereas 6 companies reported lower levels. In the context of 
horizontal networks, it was observed that in dispersed networks coordinated by a lead company 
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there is high asymmetry of economic power and influence amongst participants, and the levels of 
loyalty and integration are relatively lower. 
In such structures, the activities and key-decisions are coordinated by one of the network members, 
which leads and manages the network, facilitating the activities of participants in their efforts to 
meet network goals (Provan and Kenis, 2008). The low level of trust outlined in this typology of 
network governance seems to indicate that lower integration and loyalty negatively impact the 
levels of trust. Loyalty plays a preponderant role towards competitiveness in business networks 
(Zaccarelli et al., 2008). 
In this mode of network governance, links amongst participants are based on the rational 
component of trust, which allows the maintenance of relationships despite low indicators of inter-
organisational and interpersonal trust. This result can be explained by the studies of Rousseau et al. 
(1998), which separate the rational component of trust from its remaining components, the 
relational and the institutional ones. Within these networks it is believed that the connection to each 
of the partners is sustained due to the visibility that lead companies lend to the remaining partners, 
and to the access to complementary services of real estate credit. 
In networks governed by administrative organisations, it is observed a level of trust which could be 
described as medium in comparison to what has been observed in the other modes of governance 
structure. In these governance structures, partner organisations may work together with one 
another, but activities and key-decisions are coordinated by a separate entity. 
In these networks of a higher bureaucratic component and which involve a higher formalisation of 
connections in the group of participating companies, including assignment of property rights, it is 
possible to infer evidence of influence of formal governance mechanisms, which seem to support 
trust in the arrangement (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Medium levels of trust would be associated to 
an also medium interaction level, which is stimulated by franchise managements, but that is still 
inferior to the common level of interaction in cooperation networks. 
Consolidating the aforementioned results, Figure 2 presents the perceptual map built from the 
analysis of correspondence between levels of TRUSTc and the modes of governance. Dimensions 1 
and 2 are those generated by the SPSS software and have no specific meaning. 
Figure 2. Perceptual map of trust vs governance mode. 
 
The perceptual map shown in Figure 2 presents the results aforementioned discussed, graphically 
representing the association between modes of governance structure (COOP, NAO and LEAD) and 
levels of TRUSTc (High, Medium and Low). As presented in Table 5, those networks structured with 
shared governance (COOP) were seen by most respondents (54%) as having higher levels of trust, 
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whereas in networks governed by a lead company (LEAD) most of the answers (55%) indicate low 
levels of trust. In networks with the presence of an administrative organization (OAG), most 
respondents (45%) associated them to medium levels of trust. The presented data represents 
empirical results which corroborate and reinforce the propositions of Provan and Kenis (2008) within 
the context of horizontal networks. 
From this analysis we can realise, in line with the propositions of Provan and Kenis (2008), that there 
is evidence of association between levels of trust and the kind of structuring of network governance, 
evidencing the interdependency relation between both variables. 
According to the studies of Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Sydow (2004), networks possess a 
dynamic of development of their own, not remaining static. From this perspective, Provan and Kenis 
(2008) affirm that governance systems are transitory structures that change according to the 
characteristics and needs of the network. 
In terms of their evolution, Menard (2004) calls the attention to the existence of networks void of 
formalised governance and set up solely based on trust among parties, evolving towards networks 
based solely on relational governance, all the way towards more complex formats, which include the 
dimensions of hierarchy and governance formalisation. From the perspective of the author, the 
nature of the network and its level of complexity (number and variability of actors involved, 
dimension and volume of transactions) may originate different governance settings, demanding 
higher or lower levels of trust. 
From the model proposed by Provan and Kenis (2008), and considering the evolutionary context of 
horizontal networks (hereby represented by real estate networks), it has been observed that, as the 
network widens and becomes more complex due to the number of actors involved and different 
levels of relations established, trust itself, even at high levels, turns out to be insufficient to sustain 
collective management and shared decision-making, which are characteristic of shared governance 
(COOP) networks. 
Thus, when the structure spreads out and begins to disperse, calling for more autonomy and power, 
levels of trust tend to lower and the demand for a more formalised governance structure emerges, 
as it is the case of networks led by a lead company (LEAD) and of those which elect an administrative 
organisation to take on their governance (OAG). Both structures showed low and moderate levels of 
trust respectively. 
Correlational analysis 
The results of analysis of non-parametric correlation between the mode of governance structure and 
the respective level of trust observed, which allow empirical and statistical evaluation of associations 
identified by CORANA, are listed in Table 6. 
Table 6. Non-parametric correlation.1* 
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Table 6 presents the correlations between governance mode and trust, both in the original variable 
(TRUST) and in the categorical one (TRUSTc). It is possible to verify that in both cases the Spearman 
coefficient is positive, being respectively of 0.384 and 0.352. 
These results indicate correlations of moderate strength, with significance levels of 0.023 and 0.038. 
Therefore, the association between the mode of governance structure in networks and trust is 
significant in the surveyed sample, corroborating the studies of Provan and Kenis (2008). 
Nevertheless, such observations are not enough in themselves, for the relation between trust and 
governance is one of interdependence, as shown above. From this perspective it is possible to admit 
that either the level of governance adopted may influence levels of trust or that there might be a 
mutual reinforcement cycle, in which trust may be developed and maintained by strategies of   
network management (Klijn et al., 2010), that is, good performance and continuous cooperation 
might increase levels of trust (Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos, 2014), even when dealing with a 
formalised governance structure. 
Specifically concerning trust, it is necessary to reinforce that this study has developed from a 
structural perspective, that is, it was considered that the adopted governance structure interferes in 
levels of trust present in the network, whereas studies such as those of Klijn et al. (2010), and Van 
Meerkerk and Edelenbos (2014), explain this relation from an agency perspective. 
What sets both approaches apart is that real estate networks are horizontal networks, formed by 
similar organisations with common goals, that is, we can verify a higher level of homogeneity in the 
network. Whereas public governance networks (Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos, 2014) are temporary 
networks, formed by several different organisations (governmental agencies, commercial agents, 
non-profit organisations, local inhabitants) specifically with the intent of solving complex issues, with 
looser interrelational levels and demanding the presence of intermediating agents. 
This distinction is necessary to explain the discussion arising from this study, which is based on the 
argumentation that the governance structure itself is able to make tangible the interaction among 
parties in horizontal networks, influencing levels of trust. Nevertheless, the presence of an 
intermediating agent is to be needed to facilitate the development of trust within more complex 
networks with diversified actors. In both contexts trust is perceived as necessary for governance 
moderation and network performance. 
5. Conclusions and remarks 
The analysis of observed results made it possible to answer the question of the proposed 
questionnaire, displaying the existence of significant association between modes of governance 
structure adopted by the surveyed networks and levels of trust evidenced by participants. Such 
results contribute to a deeper understanding of the relation between trust and mode of governance 
structure in business networks.  
From the perspective of empirical contribution to research on business networks, one can verify the 
existence of a statistically meaningful association between diverse modes of governance structure in 
networks and different levels of trust. 
In the surveyed sample there is evidence supplied by correspondence analysis and its respective 
perceptual map, that higher levels of trust are associated to cooperation networks in which real 
estate agents of similar size share network governance. Frequent interaction amongst decision-
making agents allows the development of trust, resulting in adherence to the trust development 
model introduced by Rousseau et al. (1998). However, as shown in the studies from Alves et al. 
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(2010) and Gulati and Nickerson (2008), the shared mode of governance encounters boundaries in 
network expansion and development, which many times lead to the existence of more bureaucratic 
and centralised structures. 
It was verified that networks governed by administrative organisations manage to somehow balance 
network expansion, structuring and formalising relationships amongst parties, but without leading to 
very low levels of trust. Such networks are associated to medium levels of trust in the surveyed 
sample.  
It was also verified that lower levels of trust are associated to geographically dispersed networks 
coordinated by a lead company that has relevance and visibility in the industry. It is believed that 
this fact possibly arises from the lower level of integration and loyalty seen amongst participants in 
this sort of network. In more dispersed networks the distance amongst participants makes it difficult 
to develop interpersonal trust as well as inter-organisational trust, once the transaction frequency 
amongst partners turns out to be lower. 
Such results confirm arguments from other studies such as the ones from Gulati and Nickerson 
(2008), and from Provan and Kenis (2008) which pointed out the importance of deeper research on 
modes of governance structure within networks. It is worth stating that formalisation in the case of 
networks governed by administrative organisations does not negatively influence levels of trust, as 
has already been defended by Poppo and Zenger (2002) and Lui and Ngo (2004). Therefore, it cannot 
be affirmed that formalisation opposes the development of trust, as the studies of Ghoshal and 
Moran (1996), Dyer and Singh (1998), Gulati (1998), Dyer and Chu (2003), and Inkpen and Curral 
(2004) indicate. 
Returning to the ideas presented in the introduction of this paper, competition also begins to occur 
in the midst of business networks and not only within individual companies. The impacts of adopting 
different modes of network governance must be adequately evaluated by managers. Decision-
making processes on the mode of governance structure must include deliberations on the level of 
trust expected for the network, balancing out the interests of partners and network strategic 
interests as a whole. It is thus justified that network managers should be aware of expected impacts 
of governance structure decisions over their performance. 
A few limitations should be taken into account. The context in which the research applies is 
restricted to real estate intermediation activities, which characterises a network of the horizontal 
type. Hence the analysis results shall not be generalised into other sectors, especially into vertical 
network contexts. The sample is not statistical, although there were efforts to attain a sample 
composition similar to that of the researched universe, including real estate firms of various sizes 
and regions of the country. Hence, the restrictions to result generalisations within the whole 
universe studied also apply. Another limitation is that it is not possible to affirm a two-way causality 
relation between the mode of governance structure and trust, for the study verifies the association 
between both variables at a given moment in time, and the research design does not supply 
precedent data for a longitudinal analysis. Lastly, the study developed from a structural perspective, 
that is, the question of the agency was not investigated.  
Considering these limitations, conducting of further studies is suggested within different frameworks 
and economic sectors, in order to complement the results hereby obtained, allowing a broader 
generalization of conclusions. Conducting future research with a qualitative approach may also 
contribute to the further clarification of the hereby obtained results due to a triangulation of 
approaches, once analysis of correlations does not allow the identification of cause-and-effect, but 
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only the identification of existing meaningful associations amongst relevant variables. Research 
designs that allow a more thorough analysis to infer the causality of the relation can be of great 
value. Lastly, the development of studies from a joint approach, associating both the structure and 
agency approaches, might result in a new and holistic branch of governance and trust analysis within 
the context of networks, complementing both this study and that of Klijn et al. (2010) and Van 
Meerkerk and Edelenbos (2014). 
References 
Afuah, A., 2013. Are network effects really all about size? The role of structure and conduct. 
Strategic Management Journal, 34(3): 257-273. 
Alves, C.A., N.K. Pizzinatto and M.N. Gonçalves, 2010. A importância estratégica dos 
relacionamentos de negócios em redes de empresas: uma visão baseada no RBV – Resource 
Based View. Revista Brasileira de Marketing, 9(2): 166-189. 
Alves, J.N., L.A.G. Balsan, G.L. De Moura and B.A.D. Pereira, 2011. As relações de confiança, 
aprendizagem e conhecimento em uma rede do setor imobiliário. Gestão. Org, 9(3): 463-485. 
Associação Brasileira das Entidades de Crédito Imobiliário e Poupança, 2012. O crédito imobiliário 
em números, levantados pela área de inteligência de mercado da Abecip. Revista do Sistema de 
Financiamento Imobiliário, 36. 
Bonett, D.G. and T.A. Wright, 2000. Sample size requirements for estimating Pearson, Kendall and 
Spearman correlations. Psychometrika, 65(1): 23-28. 
Burlat, P., B. Besombes and V. Deslandres, 2003. Constructing a typology for networks of firms. 
Production Planning and Control, 14(5): 399-409. 
Castells, M., 2000. The information age: economy, society and culture. Vol. 1. The rise of the 
network society. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, UK. 
Conselho Federal de Corretores de Imóveis, 2012. Cofeci notícias – publicação do conselho federal 
de corretores de imóveis. Brasília, DF, Brasil. 
Dyer, J.H. and W. Chu, 2003. The role of trustworthiness in reducing transaction costs and improving 
performance: empirical evidence from the United States, Japan, and Korea. Organisation 
Science, 14(1): 57-68. 
Dyer, J.H. and H. Singh, 1998. The relational view: cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganisational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4): 660-679. 
Fritz, M., G. Martino and G. Surci, 2008. Trust conditional on governance structure: theory and 
evidence from case studies. Journal on Chain and Network Science, 8(1): 33-46. 
Gibbons, J.D. and S. Chakraborti, 2011. Nonparametric statistical inference. Springer Berlin, Berlin, 
Germany. 
Ghoshal, S. and P. Moran, 1996. Bad for practice: a critique of the transaction cost theory. Academy 
of Management Review, 21(1): 13-47. 
Grandori, A. and G. Soda, 1995. Inter-firm networks: antecedents, mechanisms and forms. 
Organisation Studies, 16(2): 183-214. 
Gulati, R., 1998. Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal, 19(4): 293-317. 
Gulati, R. and J.A. Nickerson, 2008. Interorganisational trust, governance choice, and exchange 
performance. Organisation Science, 19(5): 688-708. 
Gulati, R. and M. Sytch, 2008. Does familiarity breed trust? Revisiting the antecedents of trust. 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 29(2-3): 165-190. 
Hair, J.F., W.C. Black, B.J. Babin, R.E. Anderson and R.L. Tatham, 2006. Multivariate data analysis. Vol. 
6. Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA. 
18 
 
Hoher, R. and A.L. Tatsch, 2011. Redes de cooperação: o caso da rede imobiliária de Santa Maria, no 
Rio Grande do Sul. Perspectiva Econômica, 7(1): 15-26. 
Idris, N.A.H., 2013. Business networks in halal food industries in Malaysia. Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia, 
47(1): 87-98. 
Inkpen, A.C. and S.C. Currall, 2004. The coevolution of trust, control, and learning in joint ventures. 
Organisation Science, 15(5): 586-599. 
Jones, C., W.S. Hesterly and S.P. Borgatti, 1997. A general theory of network governance: exchange 
conditions and social mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 22(4): 911-945. 
Klijn, E.H., J. Edelenbos and B. Steijn, 2010. Trust in governance networks its impacts and outcomes. 
Administration and Society, 42(2): 193-221. 
Krishnan, R., X. Martin and N.G. Noorderhaven, 2006. When does trust matter to alliance 
performance? Academy of Management Journal, 49(5): 894-917. 
Lazzarini, S.G., F.R. Chaddad and M.L. Cook, 2001. Integrating supply chain and network analyses: 
the study of netchains. Journal on Chain and Network Science, 1(1): 7-22. 
Leick, B., 2013. Balancing firm and network-based resources to gain competitive advantage: a case 
study of an artisanal musical instruments cluster in Germany. Management Revue: 77-95. 
Li, W., R. Veliyath and J. Tan, 2013. Network characteristics and firm performance: an examination of 
the relationships in the context of a cluster. Journal of Small Business Management, 51(1): 1-22. 
Lin, Z.J., M.W. Peng, H. Yang and S.L. Sun, 2009. How do networks and learning drive M&As? An 
institutional comparison between China and the United States. Strategic Management Journal, 
30(10): 1113-1132. 
Lui, S.S. and H.Y. Ngo, 2004. The role of trust and contractual safeguards on cooperation in non-
equity alliances. Journal of Management, 30(4): 471-485. 
Majava, J., V. Isoherranen and P. Kess, 2013. Business collaboration concepts and implications for 
companies. International Journal of Synergy and Research, 2(1): 23-40. 
Man, A.P., 2004. The network economy: strategy, structure and management. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK.  
Menard, C., 2004. The economics of hybrid organisations. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft: 345-376. 
Mu, J., G. Peng and E. Love, 2008. Interfirm networks, social capital, and knowledge flow. Journal of 
Knowledge Management, 12(4): 86-100. 
Nohria, N., 1992. Is a network perspective a useful way of studying organisations? In: Nohria, N. and 
R.G. Eccles (eds.) Networks and organisations. Harvard Business School Press, Brighton, MA, 
USA, pp. 1-22. 
Park, S.H., 1996. Managing an interorganisational network: a framework of the institutional 
mechanism for network control. Organisation Studies, 17(5): 795-824. 
Poppo, L. and T. Zenger, 2002. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes 
or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8): 707-725. 
Powell, W., 1990. Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organisation. Research in 
Organisational Behaviour, 12(1): 295-336. 
Provan, K.G. and P. Kenis, 2008. Modes of network governance: structure, management, and 
effectiveness. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(2): 229-252. 
Provan, K.G., A. Fish and J. Sydow, 2007. Interorganisational networks at the network level: a review 
of the empirical literature on whole networks. Journal of Management, 33(3): 479-516. 
19 
 
Ring, P.S. and A.H. Van de Ven, 1994. Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational 
relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19(1): 90-118. 
Rousseau, D.M., S.B. Sitkin, R.S. Burt and C. Camerer, 1998. Not so different after all: a cross-
discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3): 393-404. 
Sydow, J., 2004. Network development by means of network evaluation? Explorative insights from a 
case in the financial services industry. Human Relations, 57(2): 201-220. 
Thorelli, H.B., 1986. Networks: between markets and hierarchies. Strategic Management Journal, 
7(1): 37-51. 
Tsai, W. and S. Ghoshal, 1998. Social capital and value creation: the role of intrafirm networks. 
Academy of Management Journal, 41(4): 464-476. 
Van de Ven, A.H. and P.S. Ring, 2006. Relying on trust in cooperative inter-organisational 
relationships. In: Bachmann, R. and A. Zaheer (eds.) Handbook of Trust Research. Edwar Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK, pp. 144-164. 
Van Meerkerk, I. and J. Edelenbos, 2014. The effects of boundary spanners on trust and performance 
of urban governance networks: findings from survey research on urban development projects in 
the Netherlands. Policy Sciences, 47(1): 3-24. 
Van Meerkerk, I., J. Edelenbos and E.H. Klijn, 2014. Connective management and governance 
network performance: the mediating role of throughput legitimacy. Findings from survey 
research on complex water projects in the Netherlands. Environment and Planning – C 
Government and Policy 33(4): 746-764. 
Williamson, O.E., 1979. Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations. Journal 
of Law and Economics, 22(2): 233-261. 
Williamson, O.E., 1985. The economic intstitutions of capitalism. The Free Press, New York, NY, USA. 
Zaccarelli, S., R. Telles, J. Siqueira, J. Boaventura and D. Donaire, 2008. Clusters e redes de negócios: 
uma nova visão para a gestão dos negócios. Atlas, São Paulo, Brazil. 
Zaheer, A., R. Gulati and N. Nohria, 2000. Strategic networks. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3): 
203. 
Zaheer, A., B. McEvily and V. Perrone, 1998. Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of 
interorganisational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organisation Science, 9(2): 141-
159. 
 
 
 
 
 
